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HEGEL ON PROPERTY AND 
RECOGNITION* 
Renato CRISTI 
RÉSUMÉ : L'État, répète Hegel, n'est « daucune façon un contrat, et son essence substantielle 
ne consiste pas à assurer inconditionnellement la protection et la sécurité de la vie et de la 
propriété des individus ». Un État instrumental, dont la seule fonction serait la protection de 
la propriété privée, serait contractuellement lié à la société civile. Cette situation affaiblirait 
l'État considérablement, car elle le priverait de l'autonomie, de iindépendance et de la 
neutralité dont il a besoin pour protéger effectivement la propriété. 
SUMMARY : The state, Hegel reiterates, "is by no means a contract, and its substantial essence 
does not consist unconditionaly in the protection and safeguarding of the lives and property 
of individuals as such." An instrumental state whose sole function were the protection of 
private property would be contractually bound to civil society. This would weaken it consi-
derably for this would deplete the autonomy, independence and neutrality required to protect 
property effectively. 
C ontemporary readers of Hegel typically characterize his conception of property as social. This relativization of property, which justifies subjecting it to higher 
regulation by civil society and the state, follows from the fact that property is not 
constituted by individuals acting on their own, but by individuals who recognize 
each other. Original occupation, a possessive relationship between an individual and 
a thing, is not sufficient ground for constituting property. Absent is the recognition 
by others and their consent to the duties imposed by property claims. What this 
view assumes is summarized by Waldron's apt phrase : "property relations do not 
exist between persons and objects ; they exist between persons and other persons."1 
Waldron follows Plamenatz, who writes that in Hegel's view "[t]o make a claim is 
not to give vent to an appetite [...]. It is to make a moral gesture understood by 
* For comments and discussion of earlier versions of this paper I thank Leo Groarke, Douglas Moggach, Jan 
Narveson, Howard Williams and David Resnick. 
1. Jeremy WALDRON, The Right to Private Property (Oxford : Clarendon, 1988), p. 267. 
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others capable of making them, a gesture that has a meaning only between persons 
who recognize one another as persons."2 This same view inspires Avineri when he 
argues that "not an individualistic but a social premise is at the root of Hegel's 
concept of property, and property will never be able to achieve an independent 
stature in his system [...]. Property always remains premised on social consensus, 
on consciousness, not on the mere fact of possession."3 
In this essay I argue that this social conception does not fully capture Hegel's 
view on property. He does propound such a view in his early political works, where 
he always ties property to recognition. But in his Philosophy of Right this conception 
is amended when dealing with property as an abstract right. The notion of abstract 
and immediate property dispenses with recognition and bears all the marks of a 
possessive individualist conception. As Hegel's argument develops, this individualist 
concept of property is joined by a social concept mediated by the recognition of 
others. This takes place within abstract right when the argument moves from property 
to contract. Contractual property involves recognition by others. But this relativiza-
tion of property is not meant to weaken individual appropriation. On the contrary, 
Hegel intends its reinforcement. Individual property is duly safeguarded only when 
social property re-emerges within civil society and a legal system contributes the 
required institutional context. Ultimately, a strong state is the best protection for 
property when it is defined in possessive individualist terms. 
I 
In the Philosophy of Right, there are three indications that mark Hegel's indi-
vidualist conception of property : his rejection of Kant's reduction of real to personal 
rights, his identification of possession and property, and the relegation of recognition 
to the sphere of contract. 
1. Hegel rejects Kant's distinction between real and personal rights,4 which 
corresponds to the distinction made in Roman law between iura in rem and iura in 
personam and to Hart's distinction between general and special rights.5 According 
to Hegel, "personality alone confers a right to things, and consequently [...] personal 
right is in essence a real right [...]. This real right is the right of personality as 
such" (§40).6 Hegel reduces personal to real rights because he considers an abstract 
2. John PLAMENATZ, "History as the Realization of Freedom," in Hegel's Political Philosophy. Problems and 
Perspectives, Z.A. Pelczynski, ed. (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 40-41. 
3. Shlomo AVINERI, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1972), 
p. 88-89. 
4. Immanuel KANT, Metaphysik der Sitten (Hamburg : Meiner, 1966), p. 70. 
5. H.L.A. HART, "Are There Any Natural Rights ?," in Theories of Right, Jeremy Waldron, ed. (Oxford : 
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 77-90. Compare with my article "Waldron on Special Rights in rem," 
Dialogue, 33 (1994), p. 183-189. 
6. Compare with G.W.F. HEGEL, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Allen W. Wood, ed., translated by H.B. 
Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). I have taken the liberty to modifiy Nisbet's 
translation in a few places. 
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and immediate notion of property, one that is not mediated by the recognition implied 
by contract. A real right requires no mediation. It is constituted by the immediate 
possessive relation between a person and a thing. Other persons are not involved 
in this abstract relation. The thing that is taken into possession is owned by nobody. 
Pufendorf's negative system of ownership is the condition that allows the constitu-
tion of this individualist concept of property. By contrast, Kant reduces real to 
personal rights. Personal rights, Hegel admits, are "rights that arise out of a contract" 
(§40). They presuppose an original situation where all things belong to everyone. 
For Kant, "the right to a thing is the right to the private use of a thing. With respect 
to that thing I gave a community of possession (original or established) with all 
other individuals.7 In order to claim the property over any one thing, agreements 
have to be reached that extinguish the existing property rights claimed by other 
persons and identify the portion to be appropriated. Here contracts precede property. 
"Strictly speaking, there is no (direct) right to a thing. What we call right is what 
we hold against a person who shares with all others (in civil society) a community 
of possession."8 
According to Hegel, property as an abstract right can only be conceived as a 
ius in rem. Contrary to Kant, for whom an individual that existed alone in the world 
would not be able to own anything, Hegel thinks that such individual may, without 
previous agreement, come to own things. Property precedes any agreement of any 
kind, a clear indication that Hegel operates here with an in rem, i.e. pre-social, pre-
contractual concept of property.9 
2. The most visible sign of Hegel's individualist concept of property is the 
argument that collapses the classical distinction between possession and property.10 
He thus moves away from his earlier political writings where he maintains that 
distinction.11 Avineri, for instance, interprets Hegel's views in the Realphilosophie II 
(1805-1806) as supporting a "trans-subjective" and "non-individual" conception of 
property. He writes : "property pertains to the person as recognized by others, it can 
never be an intrinsic quality of the individual prior to his recognition by others. 
While possession relates to the individual, property relates to society ; since posses-
sion becomes property through the other's recognition of it as such, property is a 
7. KANT, op. cit., p. 70. 
8. Ibid., p. 72. 
9. Hegel refers to Heineccius who defined ius in rem as the "facilitas homini in rem competens, sine respectu 
ad certam personam.'" HEINECCIUS, Elementa Juris Civilis (Leipzig : Beer, 1729), §332. 
10. Compare with W.W. BUCKLAND and A.D. MCNAIR, Roman Law & Common Law. A Comparison in Outline 
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1936), p. 58ff. ; Max KASER, Ergentum und Besitz im alteren 
romischen Recht (Koln-Graz : Bôhlau Verlag, 1956), p. 6ff. 
11. In the Hegel's Realphilosophie II, the distinction between possession and property presupposes the distinc-
tion between a state of nature and a state of right and duty. When individuals are seen within a state of 
nature their relation to the world is a purely possessive one and, as Hegel asserts, "this possession is still 
not property" (G.W.F. HEGEL, Realphilosophie II, Jenaer Realphilosophie, J. Hoffmeister, ed. (Hamburg : 
Meiner, 1967), p. 206). Hegel adds : "[...] taking possession also means the exclusion of a third party" (p. 
207). Recognition allows possession to attain a juridical status. Possession when "recognized by another, 
becomes my property" (p. 207). 
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social attribute".12 Avineri is not aware that Hegel collapses this distinction in his 
Philosophy of Right in order to make room for an individualist concept of property. 
I will summarily retrace the steps of Hegel's argument. 
Hegel introduces the distinction between possession and property in §45. But 
the terms of this distinction are defined in a manner that ensures the collapse of 
possession into the logical space defined by property. 
To have external power over something constitutes possession, just as the particular 
circumstance that I make something my own out of natural need, drive, and arbitrary 
will is the particular interest of possession. But the circumstance that I, as free will, am 
an object to myself in what I possess and only become for the first time an actual will 
by this means constitutes the genuine and rightful element in possession, the determi-
nation of property (§45). 
Possession, defined as "external power," does not constitute a right. As an 
expression of our natural will possession is a matter of fact devoid of prescriptive 
value. By contrast, property involves a rightful or lawful relation of the will to the 
thing. Our external power over a thing ceases to be merely possessive and becomes 
property. The sphere of right lies beyond that of natural or arbitrary will, Hegel 
adopts the traditional distinction between possession and property, which defines 
possession as a mere factual or physical taking a thing, and property as legally 
recognized possession. 
Hegel's next step undermines this traditional distinction at the level of abstract 
right. Possession, which should serve as the point of departure for the process that 
leads to rightful appropriation, is unable to retain logical priority over property. 
Possession manifests the arbitrary, subjective will of an individual and property 
expresses our own free will. But why is it possible for 'free will', and not for 
'subjective will', to appropriate a thing rightfully ? Since it is inconceivable that the 
thing itself, which is pure externality by definition, may oppose a kind of measured 
resistance to the advances of the human will, arbitrary or free, why is property not 
constituted immediately ? Why does its realization need an intermediate possessive 
stage ? What this indicates is that in the absence of objective limitations, there is 
nothing to prevent the will from fully appropriating the thing. But this leaves no 
logical space for a possessive stage constituted prior to property. Just as the sub-
jective will collapses into the free will, so possession collapses into property. 
After the collapse of the logical priority of possession over property, Hegel turns 
to the question of its temporal priority. His argument shows that appropriation 
follows first occupancy immediately so that the possibility of a transition from 
possession to property is cancelled. Hegel addresses the issue of first occupancy in 
the following terms : 
That a thing belongs to the person who happens to be the first to take possession of it, 
is an immediately self-evident and superfluous determination, because a second party 
cannot take possession of what is already the property of another (§50). 
12. AVINERI, op. cit., p. 88-89. 
338 
HEGEL ON PROPERTY AND RECOGNITION 
In the first place, since the first occupant finds no objective limitations in the 
thing itself, he is not required to stay for an unspecified period of time suspended 
in the stage of mere possession. When a second person steps forward and claims 
that same thing, she will discover that the first occupant is already its proprietor. 
When did his appropriation first take place ? When did the first occupant or pos-
sessor of a thing assert full proprietorship ? Since there are non conditions imposed 
by the thing itself and no "accompanying genius to protect it from external attacks,"13 
no objective grounds exist for a waiting period at the end of which his property 
would take effect. Even when the time stretching between his first possessive appre-
hension, i.e. the time when he was a mere possessor, and the claim raised by her 
were to be decreased ad infinitum, she would never be able to catch him in the 
stage of possession. At no time may the first possessor be seen as mere possessor. 
Appropriation takes effect immediately, leaving no room for a purely possessive 
stage. In the second place, if the second person were to take effective possession 
of the property of the first person, she would not maintain a merely possessive 
relation in regards to it. The thing can serve as the term of only one relationship, 
the property relationship. Taking possession of that thing immediately extinguishes 
the proprietary rights of the first person and institutes those of the second. Between 
property and non-property there can be no intermediate stage. Possession is unable 
to assert a temporal space of its own. The temporal distinction between possession 
and property collapses in favour of property. Property is possession, i.e. an imme-
diate relation between a person and a thing. 
3. The definition of property as an abstract and immediate right cancels the 
possibility of mediation. This precipitates the collapse of the distinction between 
property and possession and property is reduced to the monological possessive 
relation between a person and a thing. No other person is required to witness the 
constitution of this individualist possessive linkage. Hegel's analysis of the three 
moments of abstract right in §40 is most instructive in this respect. The first moment 
explicitly assumes the identity possession and property. Property is thus defined as 
"the freedom of an individual person who relates only to himself (§40). This leaves 
no room for recognition in the configuration of pre-contractual property. Recognition 
shows up when the argument advances to the sphere of contract, the second moment 
of abstract right. Contract allows the formation of a "common (gemeinsamen) will" 
for it makes it possible for an individual proprietor to relate "himself to another 
person" (§40). The formation of this common will is what allows the mediation of 
property through mutual personal recognition. Property is not anymore defined by 
the monological relation between a person and a thing ; it is a social event constituted 
by the recognition of others. The reinstatement of the distinction between possession 
and property signals the introduction of this new conception of property. In §78, 
13. KANT, op. cit., p. 71. I am aware that Kant uses this image to prove a different point. In accordance with 
his reduction of real to personal rights, Kant maintains that a real right does not involve a direct relation 
between a person and a thing. The external thing, when not in the hands of its possessor, does not retain 
of itself an obligation to its first possessor. This is so because my right does not reside in the thing as a 
protective genius. Of itself it cannot resist the possessive advances of a third party. 
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Hegel declares that someone who intends to acquire property by means of a contract 
need not take the thing thus acquired into immediate possession. Possession is 
defined as a purely "external" circumstance that does not alter the "substantive" 
aspects involved in property (§78). 
II 
Hegel's individualist concept of property loses it abstraction and immediacy 
when he introduces recognition. Hegel does so in the paragraph that marks the 
transition from property to contract. 
This relation of will to will is the true distinctive ground in which freedom has its 
existence. This mediation whereby I no longer own property by means of a thing and 
my subjective will, but also by means of another will, and hence within the context of 
a common (gemeinsamen) will, constitutes the sphere of contract (§71). 
I become a proprietor and my will attains exclusive right to possess, use, enjoy 
or dispose of a thing, when I am recognized as such by another party. I am a 
proprietor in the presence of the will of another person. I own property not as an 
abstract will, but as a will mediated by the recognition of others. In the pre-
contractual stage, property was constituted solely by the relation of my subjective 
will to a thing. The transition to contractual property makes recognition an essential 
moment, for "contract presupposes that the contracting parties recognize each other 
as persons and owners of property" (§71). 
Despite the social aspect involved in contract, the contractual relation itself 
remains abstract. It is ruled by arbitrary will and the agreements that it yields 
constitute a merely common will. 
The identical will which comes into existence through the contract is only a will posited 
by the contracting parties, hence only a common (gemeinsamer) will, not a will that is 
universal in and of itself (§75). 
Hegel contrasts the common will attained by means of contract with the uni-
versal absolute will that sustains institutions like the family and the state. He strongly 
denounces the intrusion of abstract property and contract into the state. This wrests 
the state of is autonomy and reduces it to a purely instrumental role, a view shared 
by both feudalism and social contract liberalism. To transfer the determinations of 
property and contract to the political sphere brings down the state to the level of 
civil society. 
In view of this poverty of contract, many have overlooked the social context 
that contractual recognition provides to property. It is held that only when Hegel 
ascends to the standpoint of Sittlichkeit, possessive individualist property is rightfully 
transcended and social property attained. Stillman, for instance, believes that the 
"major institutions of ethical life are rooted in community, impose obligations, and 
so overcome the atomism and individualism of property and contract."14 This is 
14. Peter STILLMAN, "Property, Contract and Ethical Life in Hegel's Philosophy of Right" in Hegel and Legal 
Theory, D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld & D.G. Carlson, eds (New York : Routledge, 1991), p. 208. 
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only partly true. When Hegel examines the notion of property within the confines 
of civil society, contract is said to actualize property. But now contract itself is 
mediated by a legal system, which is again part of the political (i.e. state) mediations 
introduced by Hegel in civil society. 
Just as right in itself becomes law in civil society, so too does my individual right, 
whose existence was previously immediate and abstract, acquire new significance when 
its existence is recognized as part of the existing universal will and knowledge. Acqui-
sitions of property and transactions relating to it must therefore be undertaken and 
expressed in the form which that existence gives to them. Property is accordingly based 
on contract and on those formalities which make it capable of proof and valid before 
the law (§217). 
In the remark to the same paragraph, Hegel adds : 
The original, i.e. immediate, modes of acquisition and titles (see §54ff.) are in fact 
abandoned in civil society, and occur only as individual accidents or limited moments. 
Hegel retrieves the notion of property as an abstract right to compare it with 
the social significance it acquires in civil society. Individualist property "whose 
existence was previously immediate and abstract" is now recognized as existing 
within a concrete institutional context. Property was initially socialized by the media-
tion of contract. But contract, viewed abstractly, is only sustained by a common will. 
The absence, at that stage, of a universal will means that legal claims are "multiple 
and mutually external." Multiple exclusive claims on any particular thing naturally 
result in a "collision of rights" (§84). Since the merely common will of the con-
tracting parties is unable to adjudicate these collisions, this leads to the rule of 
vengeful justice dispensed by individuals randomly. This inference from abstract 
freedom is Hegel's version of the state of nature. By contrast, the legal system that 
is put in place within civil society expresses an "existing universal will." This means 
that the modes of appropriation that seemed early on to be in accordance with right 
are now abandoned in civil society, even though they may reappear in exceptional 
circumstances. It also means that we have moved away from the state of nature. 
Hegel recognizes that in the system of needs "the remnants of a state of nature" 
are retained (§200). This is due to the fact that the system of needs contains the 
"universality of freedom, but only abstractly and hence as the right of property" 
(§208). For Hegel this means that property is now fully socialized for it is protected 
by a universal will. 
Ill 
The dual conception of property held by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right betrays 
a duality of aims. In order to override egalitarian aspirations and redistributive claims 
by the state, Hegel prioritizes and entrenches an individualist concept of property. 
At the same time, he observes that the legal protection of private property requires 
its socialization. A social concept of property first emerges within the sphere of 
abstract tight. Then, the establishment of a protective legal system within civil 
society introduces a political factor that moves us even further away from the meager 
socialization provided by abstract contract. Finally, with Hegel's state we reach the 
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apex of this process of socialization. But the effectiveness of the state as a protective 
agency cannot be guaranteed if its sole function is the protection of property. To 
avoid turning it into an instrument in the service of sovereign property owners, 
Hegel reinforces the state's autonomy and underscores its priority with respect to 
civil society. 
Hegel is fully aware of the dangers involved in the socialization of property. A 
social concept of property and the concomitant distinction between possession and 
property clear the way for thinkers like Rousseau and Fichte whose aim is the 
relativization of private ownership. Hegel is particularly concerned about Fichte's 
proto-socialist proposals. In his Grundlage des Naturrechts, Fichte distinguishes 
between possession and property and defines the latter as a social institution groun-
ded on the reciprocal recognition of individuals. "When an individual is posited in 
relation to others, his possession becomes rightful only insofar as he is recognized 
by others. In this manner, he attains for the first time external common legitimation, 
common to him and the parties that recognize him. Thus possession becomes pro-
perty for the first time."15 Mediated by recognition, property acquires a social 
function and ceases to be an absolute right. This means that an individual is justified 
in holding a certain amount of property "on condition that all citizens can make a 
living on their own ; it becomes their property. Obviously, this must be determined 
by the power of the state."16 Hegel intends to ward proprietors from Fichte's Jaco-
binism by prioritizing individualist property both logically and temporally. Possibly 
as a response to Fichte, Kant granted property rights to individuals within the state 
of nature, but he defined them as provisional and not peremptory rights.17 This was 
not a suitable defense of private property for it left it exposed to communal consent 
and supervision. A liberal individualist conception of property can only survive as 
an entrenched absolute right. This is what Hegel attempts to do in his exposition 
on pre-contractual property in the Philosophy of Right. 
Hegel is aware of the fact that the establishment of a protective legal system 
implies the socialization of property. The figure of contract, its first socialization, 
is inadequate as a protective devise. Due to its abstract nature, the contractual 
recognition that transmutes individual into social property is a bare gesture that lacks 
institutional backing. The restoration of any infringement of contractual property is 
guided by vengeful justice (§102). This proves to be an inherently unstable procedure 
that shares the inadequacy of the executive justice allowed by Locke to natural 
individuals. Individual property is duly safeguarded only when social property re-
emerges within civil society and a legal system contributes the required institutional 
context, geared specifically, as Hegel acknowledges, to "the protection of property" 
(§188 & 208). But the protection of property must be understood in its most liberal 
sense. It cannot involve redistribution by taxation or any other egalitarian interven-
15. Johann FICHTE, Grundlage des Naturrechts, in Sàmmtliche Werke, III (Berlin : Veit und Comp, 1845), p. 130. 
\6.lbid., p. 213. 
17. I discuss Hegel's reaction to Fichte and Kant in my essay "Hegel on Possession and Property," Canadian 
Journal of Political and Social Theory, 2 (1978), p. 111-124. 
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tion, for this is contrary to the principle of civil society which requires that the 
livelihood of the needy be mediated by work (§245). Hegel's social concept of 
property does not leave private property exposed to socialist expropriation. On the 
contrary, it is proposed as a way to expedite the protective role assigned to the state 
and the judicial institutions it strongly supports. Hegel's individualist concept of 
property does not exclude but on the contrary demands the supremacy of the state 
over the individual. At times Hegel reads like a Prussian Locke. 
Contrary to Locke, however, Hegel places judicial institutions within the con-
fines of civil society and distinguishes sharply between civil society and the state. 
He does so in order to avoid the impression that the "sole function [of the state] is 
to protect and secure the life, property and the arbitrary will of everyone," for this 
would mean that "the state is merely an arrangement dictated by necessity" (§270). 
The state, Hegel reiterates, "is by no means a contract, and its substantial essence 
does not consist unconditionally in the protection and safeguarding of the lives and 
property of individuals as such" (§100). An instrumental state whose sole function 
were the protection of private property would be contractually bound to civil society. 
This would weaken it considerably for this would deplete the autonomy, indepen-
dence and neutrality required to protect property effectively. Hegel's affirmation of 
a strong state, one which rises above civil society, is the condition that sustains the 
possibility of possessive individualist property. This socialization of property goes 
hand in hand with an assertion of absolute individualist property. It is not at all 
inconsistent on the part of Hegel to affirm jointly both conceptions of property. It 
is not inconsistent either for him to affirm that only "a state which is strong [...] 
can adopt a more liberal attitude [...]" (§270), for only a state which strongly affirms 
social property can safeguard individual property defined absolutely. 
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